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I. INTRODUCTION
THE MODERN WORLD has become a place of increas-
ing antagonism between landowners and the aeronauts
that inhabit the skies above them. Real estate developers
push their glass and steel structures skyward,' while newly
regulated airspace compresses less sophisticated aircraft
closer to the ground.2 Military jets thunder across valley
1 See generally URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, TALL OFFICE BUILDINGS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1985).
2 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., AIR-
MAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 96-101 (May 3, 1990) [hereinafter AIM]. Airspace
over busy airports is typically designated as either a Terminal Control Area (TCA)
or an Airport Radar Service Area (ARSA). Id. The dimensions of both a typical
TCA and ARSA can be analogized to upside-down wedding cakes. For example,
the typical ARSA airspace consists of two circles, both centered on the primary
ARSA airport. Id at 100. The inner circle (first layer of the inverted cake) has a
radius of five miles and extends from the surface up to 4000 feet. Id. The outer
circle (second layer of the inverted cake) begins vertically at 1200 feet, ends verti-
cally at 4000 feet, and includes the airspace outside of the inner circle that is
within a 10 mile radius of the airport. Id. To avoid participating in either a TCA
or an ARSA, aircraft are forced to either fly at high altitudes above them or fly
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floors training to avoid enemy radar,3 and helicopters cir-
cle above private homes in search of illegal activities.4
Cramped airports impose new runway departure and arri-
val routes onto nearby unwilling neighborhoods5 as urban
development creeps towards existing airport runways.6
As a constitutionally protected commodity,7 property is
something with which academicians have long been con-
cerned, but a debate about who owns the sky has occa-
sionally been scoffed at by pragmatists interested in more
"pressing" property issues.8 A discussion of airspace
property rights, however, can no longer be considered a
frivolous academic exercise, for it is fraught with real and
practical implications. In today's shrinking world, even
the layman now has reason to wonder just how far these
rights extend above his roof top.
close to the ground below one tier of the upside-down cake altitude. See also 14
C.F.R. §§ 71.12, .14 (1989).
-1 AIM, supra note 2, at 132. A little known and less understood type of air-
space is the Military Training Route (MTR). Id. Normally, all aircraft operating
below 10,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) are limited to a maximum speed of 250
knots. 14 C.F.R. § 91.70. Military aircraft operating within an MTR, however,
may exceed 250 knots at altitudes well below 1500 feet above ground level (AGL).
AIM, supra note 2, at 132.
4 Florida v. Riley, 109 S.Ct. 693 (1989) (a police helicopter circling 400 feet
above a home did not constitute a "search" for which a warrant was required); see
also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (police officers flying over a private
home at 1000 feet in search of marijuana was not considered a "search" for which
a warrant was required).
• See, e.g., Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970); Pied-
mont Begins Program to Expand Baltimore Service, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 1,
1986, at 64; Private Pilots Want Airfields & Airspace, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 27,
1988, Metro, part 2, at 1, col. 1; Love, D/FW Growth Likely To Jam Already Crowded
Sky, Delay Flights, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
, See, e.g., PRACTISING LAw INSTITUTE, AIRPORT LOCATION PROBLEMS (1972); Re-
zoning Worries Dallas-Ft. Worth Officials, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 9, 1978, at
36.
7 The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that, "No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend V. Similar language appears in the fourteenth amend-
ment, which states, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 See Spector, Vertical and Horizontal Aspects of Takings Jurisprudence: Is Airspace Prop-
erty?, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 489 (1986) (question of whether property extended verti-
cally above the surface categorized as "silly").
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The intrusion of low-flying aircraft at annoying alti-
tudes sparks numerous interesting and important ques-
tions. Did a trespass take place?9 Can an action for
nuisance be filed?' 0 Has someone taken an easement of
some sort, making an inverse condemnation suit appro-
priate?" Is a search warrant needed by government pilots
when looking into citizens' backyards? 12 Is someone neg-
ligent if the landowner is disturbed in the use and enjoy-
ment of his land?' 3 What about noise pollution?' 4 While
these issues deserve lengthy discussion, this article will fo-
cus on a much more fundamental question: Just exactly
who owns the airspace?
The subject of this comment is limited to airspace prop-
erty rights in the landowner versus aviation context. A
landowner's right to extend structures into the airspace
above his property is a different issue involving land use
and zoning considerations, which several recent articles
have addressed at length.' 5 In addition, the following dis-
cussion focuses on "low altitude' 6 airspace property
rights. The reason for this narrow focus, as opposed to a
9 See generally Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 J. AIR L. & CoM. 341
(1960).
,o See, e.g., Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Note,
Inverse Condemnation and Nuisance: Alternative Remedies for Airport Noise Damage, 24
SvlRCUSE L. REV. 793 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Kettelson, Inverse Condemnation of Air Easements, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 97 (1968); Spector, supra note 8; Note, supra note 10.
12 See City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 140 S.E.2d 341 (1965).
I., See Neher v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967).
'4 See, e.g., Rockett, Airport Noise: Did the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act of
1979 Solve the Problem?, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 499 (1986); Werlick & Krinsky, The
Aviation Noise Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal
Liability Shuffle, 15 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 69 (1981).
,5 See, e.g., Artime, Florida's Future is Up in the Air, 1984 FLA. B. J. 465; Frankel,
Three-Dimensional Real Property Law: The Truth About "Air Rights ", 12 REAL EST. L. J.
330 (1984); Kennedy, New Yor City Zoning Resolution Section 12-10:. A Third Phase in
the Evolution of Airspace Law, XI FORDHAM L. REV. 1039 (1983); Wright, The Model
Airspace Act: Old and New Law for Contemporary Land Use Problems, 1972 LAw & Soc.
ORDER 529.
16 "Low Altitude Airway Structure" is defined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary
as, "[tihe network of airways serving aircraft operations up to but. not including
18,000 feet MSL." AIM, supra note 2, at 240. For the purposes of this writing,




discussion of airspace property rights in general, is practi-
cal in nature. That a landowner has no right to airspace at
30,000 feet above his property not only makes common
sense, Iv but has clearly been determined by the United
States Supreme Court as well.' 8 Proponents of landown-
ers' rights to airspace have long since abandoned the field
of high altitude airspace to the aviation community.' 9 The
battle, however, continues to rage in the low altitude air-
space arena.
II. THE ORIGINS OF AIRSPACE PROPERTY RIGHTS
THEORIES
The first written theory of airspace property rights
comes from the Roman Law maxim cujus est solum, dus est
usque ad coelum (whoever has the land possesses all the
space upwards to an indefinite extent) .20 This maxim
later found its way into English common law and was pro-
17 Anderson, supra note 9, at 341. "It is obvious that in the context of latter-day
air commerce a rigid application of the [ownership from the earth to the heavens]
doctrine could not long survive, at least without substantial modification." Id.
18 See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). In Laird, the Supreme Court held
that even when damage to the underlying property occurred (allegedly from the
sonic booms created by high flying military jets), the property interests of the
landowner were not intruded upon. Id. at 799-80. As support for this proposi-
tion, the Court quoted language from the landmark airspace property rights case,
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), which dismissed the idea of owner-
ship of land extending to the periphery of the universe. The language cited by the
Court from the Causby opinion states:
[Tihat doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a pub-
lic highway . . . were that not true, every transcontinental flight
would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common
sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the
airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their
control and development in the public interest and transfer into pri-
vate ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
Laird, 406 U.S. at 799-80 (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 260-61).
,o See Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo
American Law, 3J. AIR L. & COM. 331 (1932).
20 See Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim "cujus est solum" in International Air Law,
1 McGILL L.J. 23, 27-28 (1952); Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est ... Quousque Tan-
dem?, 26J. AIR L. & CoM. 237, 240 (1959); Lardone, Airspace Rights in Roman Law,
2 AIR L. REV. 455 (1931).
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moted with great force by Sir Edward Coke.2' Lord Black-
stone also pitched his support behind the maxim, which
was eventually accepted as the predominant common law
airspace property rule in English courts.22
Like many other common law rules, cujus est solum, ejus
est usque ad coelum soon found its way across the Atlantic
and solidly established itself in the United States. 23 Lord
Coke's touted maxim withstood the scrutiny of time in the
American courts, remaining the uncontested rule on air-
space property rights until the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury.24 On December 17, 1903, however, two daring
American brothers near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina
sparked a technological revolution that would soon bring
Lord Coke's well reasoned doctrine crashing in upon it-
self.23 The flaw in his reasoning was quite simple, "Lord
Coke never took an airplane ride." 26
III. AIRSPACE PROPERTY THEORIES IN AN
AERONAUTICAL WORLD
A. The Great Airspace Debate
With the military build-up leading to the Second World
War and the spread of civil aviation around the world, the
American court system soon faced a plethora of airspace
trespass and nuisance cases.27 This flood of novel legal
problems caught American courts without a sensible legal
rule with which to address the inevitable clashes between
21 For a summary of the history of airspace as property under English Common
Law, see R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 11-30 (1968).
22 See id.
23 See id. at 31-65.
24 See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922) (holding that every firing of artillery projectiles over claimant's land consti-
tuted a trespass).
25 For a brief account of the Wright Brothers and their historic flight, see Binns,
The Wright Brothers, in THOSE INVENTIVE AMERICANS 164-74 (1971).
26 R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 7.
27 For a history of the explosion of both civil and military aircraft activity in the
United States from 1930 through the Second World War, see generally R. BIL-
STEIN, FLIGHT IN AMERICA 83-165 (1987).
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landowners and pioneering airmen. 28 To hold that every
overflight was an actionable trespass would hamper the
young industry and the military's ability to train; yet, to
allow every low-flying barnstormer to terrorize rural com-
munities with no consequence seemed an equally bad al-
ternative. Concerned legal minds soon rose to the
challenge, and during the early twentieth century a great
debate over airspace property rights thundered across the
American legal landscape. 9
B. Separate Approaches to a Common Problem
No less than six separate theories were thrust into the
airspace debate.3 0  In order to better appreciate the survi-
vors of these original theories, and make coherent recom-
mendations for the future, each of these six theories will
be briefly described.
1. Absolute Ownership Theory
This is Lord Coke's old ad coelum maxim, whereby the
owner of the land owns the airspace above it without
limit. 3' This theory, undoubtedly the most threatening to
the aviation industry, was never adopted by any court as
applied to aviation cases. 2
28 S. RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS 107 (1944).
See, e.g., Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631
(1928); Bouve, Private Ownership ofAirspace, 1 AIR L. REV. 232 (1930); Fagg, Airspace
Ownership and the Right of Flight, 3J. AIR L. & COM. 400 (1932); Kingsley, The Correl-
ative Interests of the Landowner and the Airman, 3J. AIR L. & CoM. 375 (1932); Swee-
ney, supra note 19.
so See R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 145. Writers on the topic very on the exact
number of categories needed to define the airspace property rights spectrum. Id.
The most commonly accepted approach has been referred to as "Rhyne's divi-
sion," which utilizes five categories. Id. at 145-47; S. RHYNE, supra note 28, at
154-62. For ease of explanation, Rhyne's category which encompasses the prop-
erty public easement theory and the tort privilege of flight theory has been di-
vided into two separate categories, making a total of six. See S. RHYNE, supra note
28, at 155-57.
" R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 102; S. RHYNE, supra note 28, at 96.
22 Anderson, supra note 9, at 341. "The 'ad coelum' doctrine was ... necessar-
ily limited to cases involving overhanging objects or missiles that encroached on
the landowner's airspace. It is obvious that in the context of latter-day air com-
merce a rigid application of the 'ad coelum' doctrine could not long survive, at
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2. Public Easement Theory
This theory espoused the idea that the owner in fact
owns the airspace above his property, but that property is
subject to a public easement to aviation traffic.33 This the-
ory is one of two modifications to the ad coelum rule. That
the owner does in fact own all the airspace above his
property is recognized, but aviation is legally afforded a
property right (easement) to traverse this property. Flight
over the property is only actionable in the event the ease-
ment is misused. 4
3. Privilege of Flight Tort Theory
Like the Public Easement Theory, this tort based the-
ory3 5 is also a modification of the ad coelum rule. The land-
owner is once again recognized as the owner of all the
airspace above his property. When an aircraft traverses
his property, a trespass has occurred, but this trespass is
privileged. The privilege acts as a defense to the claim of
trespass.3 6 The property owner will only prevail when it is
found that the privilege was abused or exceeded. 7 This
tort approach differs from the property approach listed
least without substantial modification." Id., see also R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at
102; S. RHYNE, supra note 28, at 96.
- R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 108. This theory was introduced by the pro-
posed Uniform State Law of Aeronautics in 1922, which was eventually adopted in
about half of the American states. Id.
34 S. RHYNE, supra note 28, at 156 (characterizing misuse as "unreasonable
interference").
-., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 194 (1934). Section 194 of the Restatement, enti-
tled "Travel Through Air Space" stated:
An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the pos-
session of another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is priv-
ileged if the flight is conducted (a) for the purpose of travel through
the air space or for any other legitimate purpose, (b) in a reasonable
manner, (c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the
possessor's enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space
above it, and (d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and
federal aeronautical authorities as are in force in the particular State.
Id.
31i See Wherry and Condon, Aerial Trespass Under the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
6 AIR L. REV. 113, 126 (1935).
47 Id.
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above in theory only. Under both approaches, aircraft can
freely traverse the airspace, as long as the privilege to
trespass or the scope of the easement is not exceeded.3 8
4. Ownership to a Fixed Height Theory
This theory is the first of two variations of the "zone"
concept.3 9 The extent of a landowner's property rights to
airspace is strictly defined by a horizontal boundary,
which divides airspace into property "zones." All air-
space above the boundary, a fixed altitude above ground
level, is public property. All airspace below the boundary
is the property of the landowner.4 ° Under this theory,
overflight cases become quite simple to analyze. If the
aircraft flew above the boundary, the landowner has no
cause of action. If the aircraft flew below the boundary,
an actionable trespass occurred.4 '
This boundary is usually defined by proponents of this
theory as the altitudes designated by Congress as "naviga-
ble airspace. ' 42 It is reasoned that Congress, by defining
what airspace is navigable, set aside that airspace as public
domain, to which the landowner below can exert no prop-
erty right.43
5. Possible Effective Possession Theory
Under this approach, a landowner's airspace property
rights are limited to a fixed height of effective posses-
sion.44 This height depends on the nature of the land and
-' See supra note 30 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the "pub-
lic easement" theory and "privilege of flight" tort theory are usually combined in
one category by writers on the topic.
sg R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 118-19.
40 See, e.g., Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385
(1930); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942).
4 See, e.g., Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942);
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); see also
R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 118-19.
42 See R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 119-27.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932);
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its possible uses." For example, this height limit would
not allow for the building of the Empire State Building in
the middle of a Kansas wheat field. A very effective argu-
ment could be made, however, for fixing this height limit
to allow for the construction of a grain silo or similar
structures that are common to that type of land. 46 This
twist on the "zone" concept forces the court to determine
just where the property rights boundary exists in each
case. Once this is done, the application of this theory is
identical to that of the "Ownership to a Fixed Height
Theory." All airspace above the possible effective posses-
sion of the landowner is public property to which the
owner can claim no legal right.47
6. No Ownership Theory
The most pro-aviation of the six, the no ownership the-
ory, advanced by the highly criticized Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transp. case,48 provides the landowner rights to only that
airspace which is actually occupied. An overflight is com-
pensable only when actual physical damage to the under-
lying property has occurred regardless of the altitude
flown.49
C. Confusion Reigns
With the exception of Lord Coke's ad coelum theory, all
of these approaches were applied to varying degrees in
different American jurisdictions. 5' The legal landscape
was a patchwork of airspace property theories, and, if for
Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
4.5 See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932);
Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
41 For a demonstration of this type of analysis, see Causby v. United States, 75
F. Supp. 262, 264 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
47 Id.
48 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936). Considered by one commentator as "probably
the worst opinion ever written on the topic." R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 131.
4,, Hinman, 84 F.2d at 755.
.1 See Wright, supra note 15, at 536.
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no other reason than a need for some modicum of cer-
tainty, it soon became evident that consistent judicial
standards had to be set."' The aviation industry was, after
all, national in nature.52 A few hours flight could traverse
numerous jurisdictions, all applying different laws and
theories to determine the legal effect the flight had on the
property below.53 If a constitutional amendment could
not be mustered,54 the Supreme Court would eventually
have to act, and eventually they did.




In 1942, a sleepy, municipal airport near Greensboro,
North Carolina, was leased to the federal government.56
Soon various large military aircraft were making use of
this facility.57 This development greatly distressed the
Causbys, who owned a house and a chicken farm less than
800 yards from the end of the runway.5 8 Large, four-
motored bombers frequently passed at tree top level over
the Causby's land in considerable numbers.59 With their
chicken business ruined, and losing sleep because of the
glare and noise of the airplanes' night operations, the
Causbys filed suit against the United States government.6 °
The Court of Claims found that there had been a taking
1 See Anderson, supra note 9, at 358.
52 See R. BILSTEIN, supra note 27, at 83-116. Travel by domestic airlines in the
United States grew from 95 million revenue passenger miles in 1932 to 677 mil-
lion in 1939. Id. at 104. Passenger traffic jumped from 475,000 passengers in
1932 to over 4 million in 1941. Id. at 100.
-," Id. at 85-96. The Boeing 247, mainstay of the United Airlines fleet in the
early 1930s, carried 10 passengers from coast to coast in about 20 hours. Id. at
89.
54 See Sweeney, supra note 19 at 331.
ss 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
56 Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751, 755-56 (Ct. Cl. 1945), rev'd, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
-7 Id. at 753-55.
58 Causby, 328 U.S. at 258-59.
Id. at 259.
Causby, 60 F. Supp. at 755-56.
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for which the Causbys were entitled compensation. 6' The
court then concluded that an easement worth $2,000 had
been taken, but made no finding as to the specific nature
of the easement or its duration.62 Noting the importance
of the question presented, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to determine if the Causby's property
had been taken within the meaning of the fifth
amendment.63
This was a case of first impression in the Supreme
Court, and certainly one long in coming.64 The highest
court in the land would address the issue that had yielded
so many different results in cases with strikingly similar
fact patterns. The Court had several theories to choose
from and major public policy considerations to ponder.
As with all Supreme Court decisions that leap into the
gulf that divides diametrically opposed viewpoints, the
Causby decision was anxiously awaited by aviation propo-
nents and landowners alike.
B. The Court's Rationale
Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. 65
After briefly reviewing the facts of the case and the con-
tentions of the United States, Justice Douglas quickly dis-
missed Lord Coke's ad coelum doctrine as inappropriate to
aviation overflight cases.66 The Court, however, also dis-
missed the idea that the landowner had no property inter-
est in airspace above his property.67 Thus, within the first
few pages of the opinion, both the ad coelum theory and
61 Id. at 757-58.
62 Id. at 758.
- Causby, 328 U.S. at 258.
64 Id.
65 Id. Justice Black wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Burton. Jus-
tice Jackson took no part in the decision. Id. at 268.
d. at 260-61.
617 Id. at 261-62. "The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be
as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer
of real estate. [When] the line of flight is over the land, . . . the land is appropri-




the Hinman "no ownership" theory were banished from
the airspace property rights debate. The Court was mov-
ing toward a middle ground.
Justice Douglas then outlined the test applied to deter-
mine if a taking had occurred. The Court concluded that
a property owner owned the "superadjacent" airspace
above his property, and an invasion of this airspace
should be treated as an actual invasion of the surface.6 8
Although the Court refused to determine the precise lim-
its of this "superadjacent" airspace, it stated that a taking
would not occur unless overflights were "so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land."' 69 From earlier state-
ments in the opinion, it can be inferred that an interfer-
ence with the enjoyment and use of the land occurs when
the value of the property has diminished due to the over-
flights. 70 At a minimum, the landowner owned as much
airspace above the ground as could be occupied or used
in connection with the land.7
Although the Court conceded that the definition of
''property" is normally obtained by reference to local
law,7 2 the Court seemed to consider its opinion as defin-
ing airspace property independently from any state defini-
tion.73  Moreover, one thing is certain, the Court
definitely concluded that airspace is "property. 74
- Id. at 265.
,3 Id. at 266.
70 Id. at 261. "Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the
recovery. And that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be
converted, as well as the existing use." Id. (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 264. "The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the
ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land. The fact that he does
not occupy it in a physical sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-is not
material." Id. (citation omitted).
72 Id. at 266. The Court stated, "while the meaning of 'property' as used in the
Fifth Amendment [is] a federal question, 'it will normally obtain its contents by
reference to local law.' " Id. (citation omitted),
73 Id. "If we look to [the controlling state jurisdiction], we reach the same re-
sult. Sovereignty in the airspace rests in the State 'except where granted to and
assumed by the United States.' " Id. (citation omitted).
7' R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 155.
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After determining that the Causbys in fact deserved
compensation for an easement that had been taken over
their property, the Court remanded the case to the Court
of Claims for a determination of the nature of the
easement.7 5
C. Analysis of the Decision
Perhaps more significant than what the Supreme Court
said is what it did not say. The Court did not seem to
embrace any of the six theories of airspace explained
above, yet it cited propositions from cases representative
of nearly all of these theories.7 6 The ad coelum theory and
the Hinman "no ownership" theory were certainly dis-
missed, but a close reading of the case is required to un-
derstand the fate of the remaining four theories.
The Court did not appear to rule out the "public ease-
ment" or "privileged trespass" theories, as North Caro-
lina followed these theories, and the Court found them
not inconsistent with the holding.77 The Court's lack of
reference to the abuse of a preexisting privilege or ease-
ment, however, leaves these theories of little significance
to the airspace as property discussion.78
The Court did seem to adopt the "possible effective
possession" theory as the absolute minimum protection
to which the landowner was entitled. 9 In addition, the
Court refused to determine where, exactly, the land-
owner's property rights ended beyond whatever airspace
was needed to insure the use and enjoyment of the under-
lying land. 0
75 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267-68. After the war the United States ceased using the
airport near the Causby's home. Causby v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 262, 263
(Ct. Cl. 1948). On remand the Court of Claims found that the easement was tem-
porary and awarded the Causbys $1,435 plus interest for the damage done by the
overflights. Id.
" R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 153.
7 Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
76 R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 154.
7I Id. at 154-55.
- Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. "The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches
above the land, is part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time
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The Court also addressed the "fixed height" concept.
It is with respect to this airspace property theory that
post-Causby decisions have, for the most part, completely
misread the Supreme Court's analysis.
D. Causby's Fixed Height Dicta
At the time of the Causby decision, navigable airspace
was defined as "airspace above the minimum safe altitude
of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority."'"
The Civil Aeronautics Authority had specified minimum
safe altitudes for en route flight, but had neglected to de-
fine minimum safe altitudes for take-off and landing.8 2
Since the flights over the Causby's property occurred
while airplanes were landing at altitudes well below the en
route minimum safe altitudes, it was apparent to the
Court that the airplanes were not within navigable air-
space.83 This did not, however, end the Court's inquiry
into the "fixed height" theory.
The Court stated that if the low altitudes used for land-
ing over the Causby's property had been designated as
minimum safe altitudes by the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity, the Court would then have addressed the validity of
such a regulation. 4 According to the Court, even the
United States conceded that if flights were so close to the
land as to render it uninhabitable, a taking would occur
even if the altitudes flown were within "minimum safe alti-
tude" flight levels.8 5 Yet, later decisions continue to cite
Causby for the proposition that aircraft within navigable
airspace, as defined by the minimum safe altitude set by
what those precise limits are. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they
are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land." Id.
" 49 U.S.C § 180 (repealed 1958).
82 Causby, 328 U.S. at 263. After the Causby decision, this oversight was cor-
rected, and today navigable airspace is defined as "airspace at and above the mini-
mum flight altitudes prescribed by or under this chapter, including airspace needed for
safe takeoff and landing." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1989) (emphasis added).
ss Causby, 328 U.S. at 263-64.
84 Id. at 263.
85 Id. at 264.
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the Federal Aviation Administration,8 6 do not infringe on
any property right of the underlying landowners.
Although it may be argued that Causby did not rule out
this proposition,88 the case certainly does not stand for
the proposition.89
E. The True Causby Test
Although the actual holding of the case is still dis-
puted, 90 it appears that Causby was intended to stand for
those minimum rights that must be afforded a land-
owner.9' To begin with, a landowner must not be dis-
turbed in the use and enjoyment of his land. In addition,
the landowner has a paramount right to exercise preroga-
tives of ownership over all the unoccupied airspace capa-
ble of possession.92 Any continuous and adverse use of
this airspace constitutes a compensable taking of a prop-
erty interest. 93
, For a history of the Federal Aviation Administration, see R. BURKHARDT, THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (1967). Starting as the Aeronautics Branch of
the Department of Commerce, the agency then became the Bureau of Air Com-
merce, then the Civil Aeronautics Authority, then the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration, next the Federal Aviation Agency, and finally the Federal Aviation
Administration. Id. at 3.
87 See, e.g., Lacy v. United States, 595 F.2d 614, 615 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Hero Lands
Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1262, 1264-65 (Cl. Ct. 1983); Matson v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 283, 285-86 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Stephens v. United States, 11
CI.Ct. 352, 358-59 (1986); Drybread v. City of St. Louis, 634 S.W.2d 519, 520
(Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
" See R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 154-55; see also Anderson, supra note 9, at
354. "Although the case has been much discussed, its holding still appears to be
disputed." Id. at 348.
89 See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 96-100 (1962) (interpreting
Causby to support a finding that a taking had occurred, despite the fact that the air
traffic was within navigable airspace); Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88 (Ct.
Cl. 1981). "[it is clear that the Government's liability for a taking is not pre-
cluded merely because the flights of Government aircraft are in what Congress
has declared to be navigable airspace and subject to its regulation." Id. at 99.
Anderson, supra note 9, at 348.






A survey of the airspace cases that were decided after
Causby reveals a significant loose usage of terms and ratio-
nales.94 Though the Causby Court focused on the taking
of an avigation easement,95 many state courts continued
to analyze airspace suits under the traditional "trespass"
and "nuisance" rationales. 96 Despite the theoretical dif-
ferences in the words' meanings,97 courts liberally
blended "nuisance" and "trespass" language, regardless
of the actual issue to be decided.9 s Much of this confusion
may be attributed to the shotgun approach to pleadings
that plaintiffs were using at the time.99 The two theories
are, however, closely wed in airspace property analysis, 00
- Id. at 157-68.
i's The word "avigation" has been defined as simply "navigation of aircraft."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 151 (1965). A more extensive
definition can be found in WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 130
(2d ed. 1983), which defines "avigation" as, "the science or art of piloting aircraft
by means of instruments, the position of the stars, or landmarks." Id. The phrase
"avigation easement" is sprinkled throughout court opinions and legal writings
that discuss the issue of the taking of airspace by aviation overflights. The phrase
distinguishes an easement as being through airspace and for aviation traffic, as
opposed to an airspace easement for buildings or a navigation easement through
water.
- See R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 157-68.
97 A concise explanation of the difference between "nuisance" and "trespass"
in this context can be found in Anderson, supra note 9, at 342, where the author
states:
Although nuisance and trespass are in some respects analogous,
each has important distinguishing characteristics. Since an invasion
of realty constitutes trespass, the invasion is actionable per se. A nui-
sance, however, must involve some interference with the use and en-
joyment of property or of personal rights and privileges, and it is
therefore the consequences which flow from the invasion which are
actionable. The invasion, in nuisance, must be unreasonable, un-
warranted, or unlawful. Further, since nuisance developed sepa-
rately from trespass, different considerations are used by the courts.
For example, continuity or recurrence has been given such great
weight that it can generally be considered an element that must be
proved to establish nuisance.
Id.
I ld.; R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 157-68.
R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 157.
Ioo ld. at 160-61. When discussing the interdependence between "nuisance"
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and most jurisdictions continued to allow plaintiffs to re-
cover under either nuisance, trespass, or an amalgamation
of both.' 0 '
The Causby case brought a new analysis into vogue as
well. The Supreme Court in Causby reasoned that a taking
of an avigation easement had occurred for which the
Causbys were entitled just compensation.10 2  Since most
complaints from landowners arise from the irritation
caused by planes landing at and departing from govern-
ment owned airports, it follows that many of the post-
Causby lawsuits focused on the theory that a compensable
taking had occurred. 0 3 Many of the suits were framed as
"inverse condemnation" actions. 0 4  Takings were also
claimed to have occurred when nearby airports got busier
or when the airplanes using them got larger and noisier.
Plaintiffs argued that the increased flight activity
amounted to an enlargement of the scope of any preexist-
ing easement. 10 5
It should be remembered, however, that at the time of
the Causby decision, an action for the taking of an aviga-
tion easement was the only practical means of recovery
from the government for many landowners. 10 6 The Causby
dissent, written by Justice Black, focused on the inappro-
priate use of actual damages as a prerequisite to a taking
and "trespass", Wright states, "It was not peculiar that this should be the situa-
tion since the low flights not only formed the basis for the nuisance but also con-
stituted trespasses." Id. at 160. "The concept of trespass, therefore, generally
helped determine that a nuisance existed, and there was a similar point where
'continuing trespasses' served to produce a taking." Id. at 164.
, Id. at 157-68.
102 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
los R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 164-65.
-4 See, e.g., City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 140 S.E.2d 341 (1965);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
10- R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 167-68.
1- Prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States gov-
ernment was considered immune from tort actions by citizens. D. DOBBS, TORTS
AND COMPENSATION 343-48 (1985). One qualification to this governmental immu-
nity was that under the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
of the United States Constitution, neither state nor federal governments could
take property without just compensation. Id. at 344.
under the Constitution. 0 7 Justice Black felt that the over-
flights amounted to nothing more than a nuisance or a
trespass. 08 In fact, it has been suggested that the Caus-
bys' inability to recover in tort using a nuisance or tres-
pass claim may have influenced the Supreme Court
decision to find that a taking had occurred. 10 9
With the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act," 0
however, actions for trespass and nuisance became avail-
able for plaintiffs in suits against the government."'
Plaintiffs could now sue under a trespass theory, a nui-
sance theory, an inverse condemnation type action, or, as
was often the case, all three at once." 2
B. The Fate of the Six Theories
Regardless of the type of action presented, courts still
had to determine just exactly what were the landowner's
property interests."3 This was an area of the law where
Causby had some settling effect.' "' Causby established that
the landowner did possess some airspace property rights,
but these rights had definite limits." 5 How courts inter-
preted these limits on a landowner's rights would deter-
mine the outcome of future overflight suits.
Considering the emphasis placed on damages and in-
terference with the "use and enjoyment" of land found in
the Causby opinion, many courts analyzed overflight cases
focusing on the actual effect of the alleged trespass on the
107 Causby, 328 U.S. at 268-275.
lot Id. at 270-71. "[Tlhe allegation of noise and glare resulting in damages,
constitutes at best an action in tort where there might be recovery if the noise and
light constituted a nuisance, a violation of a statute, or were the result of negli-
gence." Id. at 269-70.
1' See Anderson, supra note 9, at 350.
,o See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1986).
D. DOBBS, supra note 106, at 345-47.
112 R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 167-68.
1 - Id. at 197.
114 Anderson, supra note 9, at 358. "The Causby case seems to have been the
unifying force, and, ambiguous as it may be, it has provided some uniformity in a
field where uniformity is clearly needed." Id.
1,"5 R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 197-99.
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underlying land. 1 6  Although admittedly an unusual
method of evaluating a trespass claim, commentators
seem to have accepted this unconventional approach as
unique to airspace trespass analysis. 1 7 Courts allowed
plaintiffs basically two methods to prove the damages nec-
essary to trigger a further inquiry into the validity of the
claim. The first involved a showing of actual damages like
those found in claims made by chicken and mink farmers
after frequent overflights caused substantial damage to
livestock." 8 The second method required a showing of
diminution in the overall value of the underlying property
as a result of frequent overflights." t9 These methods of
proof, required to show that a trespass or taking has oc-
curred, again show the blending of traditional nuisance
elements with those of trespass.
1 20
As was mentioned earlier, many jurisdictions also began
to drift towards the "ownership to a fixed height" theory
of airspace property rights. 2 ' There are several probable
reasons for this drift. When the language "airspace
needed for safe takeoff and landing" was added to the
definition of what constituted "navigable airspace," some
courts saw this as an expression of Congressional intent
to get around the facts of the Causby holding. 22 Other
-, See, e.g., Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 238 (Ct. CI. 1959); Highland
Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. CI. 1958).
117 Anderson, supra note 9, at 359.
I] See, e.g., Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn.
1963); Weisburg v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1961); Maitland v.
Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949).
"19 See, e.g., A. J. Hodges Indus. v. United States, 355 F.2d 592 (Ct. Ci. 1966);
Dick v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 491 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Pope v. United States, 173
F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959); City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 140
S.E.2d 341 (1965).
120 See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship
between "nuisance" and "trespass."
121 See, e.g., Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Mills
v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 56 Wash. 2d 807, 355 P.2d 781 (1960); Anderson,
supra note 9, at 358-59. "[A]nother element of trespass to airspace appears to be
that the flight in question must be below the floor of the navigable airspace as
defined by the federal regulations concerning minimum cruising altitudes." Id.
1212 See, e.g., Kuntz v. Werner Flying Serv., 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W.2d 476 (1950);
Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947).
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courts read the Causby opinion as a reaffirmance of the
proposition that Congress had established public domain
as all "navigable airspace," and a landowner's rights in
airspace ended at the base of public domain airspace.12 3
Behind this reasoning, however, there may have lurked a
more practical rationale for following the "fixed height"
theory. If nothing else can be said in its support, the
"fixed height" theory did promote certainty and discour-
age litigation. 124 If a landowner could not prove that ex-
cursions occurred outside the altitudes designated as
"navigable airspace," many jurisdictions simply dismissed
his suit on this ground alone. 125
Despite this subtle shift towards the pragmatic "fixed
height" theory, it appeared to many that the judicial trend
in America was towards an "effective possession" ap-
proach to airspace property rights.' 26 After all, "effective
possession" was the theory that seemed most in line with
the Causby decision.' 27 Two Supreme Court decisions,
roughly ten and twenty years after Causby, seem to
strongly support this view as well. 2 8 It looked as if Amer-
ican courts would finally narrow the field of airspace prop-
erty theories and put the "fixed height" concept to rest.
The passage of time, however, revealed that this view of
the future of airspace property rights was not quite
correct.
,2' See, e.g., Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959). This con-
clusion is probably based on the dicta found in the Causby opinion that reads,
"The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'air-
space above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronau-
tics Authority.' " Causby, 328 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted).
124 For an example of a court's use of the "fixed height" theory, see Powell v.
United States, 1 CI.Ct. 669 (1983).
125 d.
126 See, e.g., R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 207-08; Comment, Ownership and Con-
trol of Airspace, 37 MARQ. L. REv. 176, 178-79 (1953); Comment, Airspace Rights of
the Subjacent Landowner, 2 ARK. L. REv. 448, 454-55 (1948).
" 2 R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 207.
12 Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Braniff Airways v. Ne-
braska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
1771990]
178 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
VI. MORE DIRECTION FROM THE SUPREME COURT
A. Dicta Ten Years After. Braniff Airways ' 29
Ten years after the Causby decision, the Supreme Court
was faced with one in a long line of "state power to tax"
cases 31 that happened to involve aviation. Typical of
these types of cases, Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board
of Equalization & Assessment presented the question of the
state of Nebraska's power to tax an interstate corpora-
tion.131 Although the facts and the holding of this case do
not bear directly upon airspace property rights, commen-
tators extracted some of what the Court said as further
proof that Causby had indeed put the "fixed height" doc-
trine to rest. 132
Particularly interesting was Justice Reed's majority pro-
nouncement that, "Federal Acts regulating air commerce
are bottomed on the commerce power of Congress, not
on national ownership of the navigable air space, as dis-
tinguished from sovereignty."'' 3 3 In addition, the Braniff
Court explained that the Causby decision held "that the
owner of land might recover for a taking by national use
of navigable air space resulting in destruction in whole or
in part of the usefulness of the land property.' 1 34 These
statements appear to dismiss a "fixed height" theory
based upon the idea that Federal Acts regulating air com-
merce define national ownership of navigable airspace. 3 5
The Braniff Court considered such Federal Acts as simply
regulating commerce and not defining a federal property
interest. The issue before the Supreme Court, however,
12' Branif, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
130 For an attempt at explaining the confusing constitutional analysis of the
"state power to tax" by the Supreme Court, see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J.
CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 316-76 (1986).
1', 347 U.S. at 590,
"' R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 200-03.
Braniff, 347 U.S. at 596.
134 Id.
1-.5 R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 202-03. "The statement found in some cases
that Congress preempted the field with its regulation of air commerce is simply
erroneous." Id.
was not airspace property rights. This perhaps explains
why courts continued to claim that Congress preempted
the airspace property rights field with its regulation of air
commerce despite the language found in Braniff. 36
B. Facing the Issue Squarely: Griggs v. County of
Allegheny13 7
Unlike the Braniff case, in Griggs v. County of Allegheny the
Supreme Court dealt with airspace issues. As in Causby,
the plaintiff in Griggs lived near a noisy airport."" Planes
taking off from the Greater Pittsburgh Airport frequently
came within thirty feet of the plaintiff's residence. 39
Claiming that an air easement had been taken without
compensation, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County against the County
of Allegheny, owner of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. 40
The factual backgrounds of the Griggs and the Causby
cases were very similar, but for two significant differences.
First, the plaintiff in Griggs chose to sue the county gov-
ernment as opposed to the United States government.' 4'
This choice created the primary issue in contention when
the case finally arrived in the United States Supreme
Court. 4 ' After the lower court found Allegheny County
liable for taking an easement over the plaintiff's land, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the decision on
the grounds that if there had been a taking in the constitu-
tional sense, the county was not liable. 143 The United
, See, e.g, Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cederhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 815 (2d
Cir. 1956); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.N.J.
1958).





142 Id. at 89-90. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Black with Justice
Frankfurter joining, focuses exclusively on the issue of holding Allegheny County
liable for a taking rather than the federal government. Id. at 90-94. "We are not
called on to pass on any question of 'taking' under the Pennsylvania Constitution
or laws." Id. at 91 n.2.
". 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
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States Supreme Court disagreed, with two justices dis-
senting, holding that the county was liable. 144
The second factual difference found in Griggs, however,
pertains to the court's consideration of the "fixed height"
theory. Between the time of the Causby decision and the
Griggs' suit, the definition of "navigable airspace" was
amended to include that "airspace needed to insure safety
in take-off and landing of aircraft."' 145  If the "fixed
height" theory were to be followed to its logical conclu-
sion, no taking could have occurred, since the planes fly-
ing over Mr. Griggs' house were within navigable
airspace. 146
The Court of Common Pleas held that a taking had oc-
curred regardless of the fact that the flights were admit-
tedly within navigable airspace as defined by Congress
and the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 147 When the
case arrived in the United States Supreme Court, the Jus-
tices were unanimous in upholding the Court of Common
Pleas determination that a taking had occurred. 48 The
Griggs Court did not, however, question the validity of the
statute defining navigable airspace, as promised in
Causby.' 49 Instead, the Court held that the fact that the
overflights were made within navigable airspace simply
had no effect on determining whether or not a compensa-
ble taking had occurred. 50
By implication, this holding should have put other
courts on notice that the foundation of the "fixed height"
144 Griggs, 369 U.S. at 90-94.
145 Id. at 88.
,4,1 See Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W.2d 476 (1950);
Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947). Both courts
followed the logic that since altitudes necessary for take-off and landing were
within "navigable airspace," a landowner could not bring an action for overflights
occurring at these altitudes. Kuntz, 43 N.W.2d at 478; Antonik, 78 N.E.2d at 758.
147 Griggs, 369 U.S. at 85.
148 Id. at 90-94.
.... Causby, 328 U.S. at 263. "If [the Civil Aeronautics Authority] prescribed [the
altitudes required for landing] as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have
presented the question of the validity of the regulation." Id.
,s, Griggs, 369 U.S. at 88-89.
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theory was no longer sound. It might be valid for a court
to hold that an overflight was not compensable above 500
feet because that was the altitude that the particular state
as sovereign had defined as the maximum height limit of a
landowner's property.151 To say, however, that the same
flight was not compensable because 500 feet was the alti-
tude designated by Congress as public domain ignores
the Griggs analysis. 15 2 Yet, the focus on a Congressional
definition of "navigable airspace" is precisely the histori-
cal basis for the "fixed height" theory.' 5 3 Many courts
considering overflight cases since Griggs, nevertheless,
continued a blind adherence to the old "fixed height"
rationale.
VII. THE "FIXED HEIGHT" THEORY AFTER GRIGGS
A. A Return to the Causby Approach
Courts considering overflight cases and their attending
airspace issues now had three Supreme Court decisions to
look to for direction. To begin with, there was the often
cited and long discussed Causby 154 decision. Next, the
dicta of Branif 155, although a case dealing primarily with a
different issue, shed further light on the Supreme Court's
thoughts on the issue of airspace ownership. Finally,
'1" See R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 202. The author concludes that "States
have a free hand . . . to determine the extent of ownership of airspace and to
enforce their laws on the subject." Id. This conclusion can be supported by the
following statement made by the Causby court: "[W]hile the meaning of'property'
as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal question, 'it will normally obtain its
content by reference to local law.' " Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. See also Adolph v.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 737 (5th Cir. 1988) (fed-
eral courts look to state law to determine property interests).
,52 See R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 202-03.
13 For a history of the "fixed height" theory and its dependency on altitudes
mandated by the federal government, see S. RHYNE, supra note 28, at 109-118. See
also R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 202-03.
1." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See supra notes 55-93 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Causby opinion.
' Braniff, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); see supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Braniff opinion.
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there was the holding in Griggs 156, which appeared to
prove those commentators and courts correct that had in-
terpreted Causby as giving little weight to the "navigable
airspace" designation when deciding if avigation ease-
ments existed. 57 As would be expected, many courts af-
ter Griggs began analyzing overflight cases using Causby
terms, such as "superadjacent airspace," and began look-
ing at the effect of overflights on the owner's "use and
enjoyment of the land," rather than focusing on whether
the overflights occurred above or below certain fixed
altitudes. 158
This focus away from the "fixed height" theory and to-
wards the Causby approach was adopted in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts shortly after Griggs was decided.'5 9
Section 194 of the First Restatement, the original theoret-
ical basis for the "privilege of flight" theory, 160 was omit-
ted entirely from the Restatement (Second). 61 All
airspace considerations were consolidated into Section
159 of the Restatement (Second), which states in part,
"Flight by aircraft in the airspace above the land of an-
other is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the im-
mediate reaches of the airspace next to the land, and (b) it
interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoy-
ment of his land.' 62 This view was adopted despite urg-
ings that the Restatement (Second) include specific
reference to the minimum safe altitudes determined by
federal regulations.16 3
One might suspect that this would be a good point to
end a discussion on the history of the airspace property
,n, Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); see supra notes 137-152
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Griggs opinion.
,.7 See, e.g., R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 154-55.
'1" See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974); Palisades
Citizens Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
'-' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
"; For a discussion of Restatement § 194 and the "privilege of flight theory,"
see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
-1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 194.
-2 Id. at § 159.
" See Anderson, supra note 9, at 359.
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debate. The Supreme Court had elaborated on the issue
on three occasions, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
was in accord with the Supreme Court, and numerous
courts were following the Supreme Court's lead. Surely
now the Causby approach to airspace property would be
universally accepted as the last word on the matter. But,
like a complicated mystery novel, the law sometimes takes
unexpected twists. It appears that neither Causby, Braniff,
nor Griggs put the "fixed height" theory to rest.
B. A Theory Reincarnate: Aaron v. United States' 64
Hardly had the ink dried on the Griggs opinion when the
United States Court of Claims, in Aaron v. United States,
was presented with a unique set of facts that would truly
test the nature of airspace property rights. Aaron involved
a combination of two cases in which multiple plaintiffs
were seeking recovery for the alleged taking of avigation
easements over their respective properties. 65 Many of
the plaintiffs owned chicken ranches, 166 an enterprise
highly susceptible to overflight damages.' 6 7 What made
Aaron particularly interesting was the fact that some of the
plaintiffs complained of overflights occurring just under
the 500 foot "minimum safe altitude" level, while the re-
maining plaintiffs complained of overflights occurring just
above the 500 foot level.' 68 The plaintiffs complained of
basically the same types of damages, but some owned
property that was slightly closer to the flight pattern alti-
tudes than did others.' 69
Applying the Causby approach to these facts, the Aaron
court should have first looked to see if the overflights had
invaded the "superadjacent" airspace above the plaintiffs'
311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
M' Id. at 799.
' Id. at 801.
167 For examples of the susceptibility of chicken operations to overflight dam-
ages, see Weisberg v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1961); Causby v.
United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Ci. 1945).
168 Aaron, 311 F.2d at 801-02.
I1 Id.
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property, 70 and then determined if the overflights had in-
terfered with the plaintiffs' "enjoyment and use" of their
land.' 7 ' Surprisingly, not only did the Aaron court, in a
unanimous decision,' 72 not apply the Causby test, but no-
where in the opinion was Causby even mentioned. 73 The
Court of Claims did make an apparent reference to Causby
by remarking that "[p]rior [to the Griggs decision] this
court and the Supreme Court had held that the United
States was liable, under certain circumstances, for the tak-
ing of an easement of flight .... ,,,7 Yet, Causby was never
mentioned by name, nor cited for any authority as to the
treatment of the issues before the court. 17 5
The Aaron opinion did make passing reference to the
Griggs case as standing for the proposition that an opera-
tor of an airport could be found liable for the taking of an
avigation easement over property necessary for approach-
ing and departing airplane traffic.' 76 No reference was
made to the Griggs holding that overflights may result in a
"taking" regardless of whether they are within "navigable
airspace."'' 77 Instead, the Aaron opinion launched quickly
into a description of the traditional "fixed height"
theory. ' 78
In support of the proposition that the "fixed height"
theory of property rights should apply to overflight cases
the Court of Claims cited but three cases. 179 The first case
170 Causby, 328 U.S. at 265.
171 Id. at 266.
,7. Aaron, 311 F.2d at 802. The opinion was authored by Judge Whitaker with
Chief Judge Jones, Judge Davis, Judge Durfee, and Judge Laramore concurring.
ld.
,73 Id. at 799-802.
174 Id. at 799.
175 Id. at 798-802.
16 Id. at 799.
177 Id. at 798-802.
'78 Id. at 801. " 'Navigable airspace' is defined as 'air space above the minimum
safe altitude of flight prescribed by [the Civil Aeronautics Authority].'. . . Hence,
flights above 500 feet over noncongested areas are in the navigable air space in
which there is a 'public right of freedom of transit.' " Id.
79 Id. The three cases cited are Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368
(1924); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Matson v.
United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
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cited, Matson v. United States,180 contains the "fixed height"
theory dicta which the Aaron court stated as the law. A
closer reading of the actual holding in this earlier Court of
Claims decision, however, reveals an identical finding to
that made in the Griggs decision. That is, while giving lip
service to "500 feet and above" levels of public airspace,
the Matson opinion actually held that a taking of an aviga-
tion easement could occur in "navigable airspace" when
aircraft were landing and departing at a nearby airfield. 81
Yet, not even the dicta in the Matson opinion is very con-
vincing when read in its entirety. "It would appear from
the Causby decision that flights above the 500-foot regu-
lated ceiling are beyond the reach of [the landowner's]
objection to interference with the landowner's property
rights."' 182 This was as decisively as the court in Matson
was willing to state the proposition, which Aaron refers to
as the absolute law.18 3
In order to give apparent authority to the Matson dicta,
the Aaron court cited, without any explanation of their re-
lation to the issue at hand, two Supreme Court decisions
on the basics of eminent domain and takings under the
fifth amendment. 8 4 Both of these cases predated Causby
by over twenty years, and neither made any mention of
avigation easements or any reference to "navigable air-
space" and the "fixed height" theory. 8 5 In fact, about the
only commonality between the two cited Supreme Court
decisions and the Matson case which they impliedly sup-
1so 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
1"' id. at 285-86. After commenting that the applicable statutes had changed
since the Causby decision to include the altitudes necessary for take-off and land-
ing within the definition of "navigable airspace," the court concluded, "We do
not think, however, that the change in the definition of navigable airspace affects
plaintiffs' causes of action." Id. at 285.
182 Id. at 286.
"8- See Anderson, supra note 9, at 354-55. Viewing the Matson reasoning as fly-
ing in the face of the federal statute, the author concludes that the Matson opinion
so construed the statute in order to avoid a constitutional question. Id.
14 Aaron, 311 F.2d at 801.
18- Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924) (predating Causby by 31
years); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (predating
Causby by 21 years).
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ported was the presence of the "eminent domain" head-
note at the beginning of each case.
A state court decision issued one year prior to Aaron
provides a stark contrast to the Aaron holding. The Ore-
gon Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Port of Portland186 in-
terpreted the Matson and Griggs decisions as rejecting the
proposition that only continuous flights at less than 500
feet could constitute a taking. 87 In addition, a federal
district court awarded damages for six helicopter flights,
made under 800 feet, just two years prior to the Aaron de-
cision.'88 In fact, one commentator has since stated that
the rule elaborated in the Aaron case was "clearly errone-
ous under an appropriate interpretation of the intent of
the Griggs decision." 89
Perhaps the misstatements of the law, dicta taken out of
context, and inexplicable case support could have been
excused by an eloquent statement of the policy promoted
by the Aaron decision. The passage that follows, however,
seems an excellent argument for abolishing the rule pro-
moted by the decision, rather than an artful defense of a
rule contrary to what the law really was:
It is true that the inconvenience and annoyance exper-
ienced from the passage of a plane at 501 feet above a
person's property is hardly distinguishable from that ex-
perienced from the passage of a plane at, say, 490 feet, but
the extent of a right-of-way, whether on the ground or on
water or in the air, has to be definitely fixed .... Congress
has fixed 500 feet as the lower limit of navigable air space;
hence, what may be permissible above 500 feet is forbid-
den below it .... 190
This language hardly seems convincing when contrasted
186 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
-7 Id. at 110. The Court stated, "'we cannot say, as a matter of law, that jet or
rocket or some other kind of noise within 500 feet, or some other number of feet,
of private land might not in a particular case cause a taking for public use." Id.
'8 Weisberg v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1961) The helicopter
flights at 800 feet were not frequent enough to constitute a taking. Damages were
awarded, nonetheless, upon a finding of negligence. Id. at 820.
-, R. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 179.
- Aaron, 311 F.2d at 801.
with the rationale rejecting the "fixed height" theory
found in the above mentioned Thornburg decision:
Whatever virtue the establishment of a 500-foot floor
under the cruising flight of aircraft may have as a matter of
public safety, there can be only one sound reason to make
it a rule of the law of real property. That reason ought to
be the knowledge . . . that flights above 500 feet do not
disturb the ordinary, reasonable landowner.19 1
Needless to say, the Aaron court decided that only those
plaintiffs who complained of overflights under the 500
foot level had stated a proper cause of action.' 92 As to
those few plaintiffs, the case was remanded to the Trial
Commissioner for a determination of their entitled com-
pensation.19 3 The petition as to the remaining plaintiffs
was dismissed,' 94 thus leading to the possible result that a
plaintiff with substantial damage to his chicken operation
was left without compensation, while a neighbor living
slightly closer to the airport was entitled compensation
for significantly less actual damages.'"5
C. The Impact of Aaron
Factual patterns like the one found in Aaron were proba-
bly not much of a concern at the time Causby was decided,
when overflights involved relatively quiet propeller driven
planes. With the advent of powerful jet engines, an arbi-
trary line in space defining a landowner's right to a rem-
edy became an issue of real concern. 196  If the Aaron
decision had been merely a quickly forgotten opinion
among the many Court of Claims overflight cases, it
19, Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 109-10.
192 Aaron, 311 F.2d at 801-02.
los Id. at 802. The two cases before the Court of Claims in Aaron originated
with Trial Commissioner Mastin G. White. d. at 799.
1- Id. at 802.
19. See Aaron v. United States, 340 F.2d 655 (Ct. Cl. 1964). On remand, the
court found that parcels belonging to nine of the plaintiffs had lost half their mar-
ket value due to the avigation easement over the land. Id. at 660.
1"o See Kettelson, supra note 11, at 97. "[It was not until jets began appearing
on the scene in the 1950's that renewed interest in the [avigation easement] prob-
lem developed rather extensively." Id.
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would not merit the attention provided above. Unfortu-
nately, as one might suspect, the Aaron case has since be-
come the law according to many recent court decisions.' 9 7
Aaron has not been followed universally, however, par-
ticularly in state courts.'98 Some federal courts incorpo-
rate the 500-foot ceiling on a landowner's rights by
stating that when an overflight occurs in navigable air-
space, a presumption of non-taking exists.' 9 9 This pre-
sumption can be overcome by proof of destruction of, or
substantial impairment to, the landowner's property.0 0
In 1981, a United States Court of Claims issued a decision
that rejected Aaron's strict reliance on the "fixed height"
theory and the 500 foot level of navigable airspace.2 0 '
Once again, it appeared that the "fixed height" theory
might be overcome by the reality of overflight damages.
VIII. THE BRANNING SCARE
A. Branning v. United States:20 2 A Timid Rejection of the
"Fixed Height" Doctrine
During the early 1970s, the United States Marine Corps
Air Station at Beaufort, South Carolina, was used by the
United States as a training field for simulated aircraft car-
rier landings.20 3 In order to perform this maneuver, train-
ees were required to fly their large F-4 jets with their
197 See, e.g., Hero Lands Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (Cl. Ct.
1983); Speir v. United States, 485 F.2d 643, 646 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Town & Country
Motor Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 180 Ct. CI. 563, 570-71 (1967); Avery v.
United States, 330 F.2d 640, 643 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
Ism See, e.g., 3775 Genesee Street, Inc. v. State, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Ct. CI.
1979); Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1969) (taking occurred
due to noise of overflight regardless of the actual physical path of the aircraft);
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); see also Palisades
Citizens Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. 420 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dicta
from opinion rejects strict adherence to "minimum safe altitudes" as test of land-
owner's recovery).
-1, See Stephens v. United States, II Cl. Ct. 352, 362 (1986).
2W Id.





noses up and tails down, with near maximum power ap-
plied, as they approached the simulated carrier deck at
low speeds and altitudes. 4 Since training was conducted
squadron-by-squadron, and each plane repeated the ma-
neuver several times, the air traffic to the intended runway
was virtually nose-to-tail over a period of several days dur-
ing each month in which the training was conducted. 5
The plaintiff in Branning owned 525 acres over which
these F-4 jets flew while practicing at the Marine field. 0 6
A claim was brought against the United States for the tak-
ing of an avigation easement over the plaintiff's land. 7
At first glance, the facts of the Branning case suggest
that a "taking" had clearly occurred for which the plaintiff
should recover. There was one slight problem, however.
The overflights complained of were at 600 feet above the
plaintiff's property, while the "minimum safe" altitude for
that airspace was 500 feet.20 8 According to the Aaron ra-
tionale, the case should have been dismissed. Fortunately
for the plaintiff, the Branning court chose not to follow this
rigid analysis.2 9
The Court of Claims made no attempt to avoid the is-
sue: "The novelty of this decision is in its holding that
defendant's use of airspace at altitudes above 500 feet,
and independent of landing and takeoff, may be a taking
of land beneath if the use is peculiarly burdensome." 210
In reaching this holding, the court reviewed the Causby de-
cision, the Griggs decision, and outlined the Oregon
Supreme Court's reasoning in the Thornburg case.2 1
These cases, along with several other federal court deci-
sions, 21 2 were contrasted with the rule found in the Aaron
I ld. at 90.
2o, id. at 91.
2' Id. at 91-92.
207 Id. at 90-91.
20$ Id. at 91-92.
"v"' Id. at 99-102.
,lo Id. at 90.
21 Id. at 96-102. For a discussion of the Thornburg decision, see supra notes 186,
187, 191 and accompanying text.
212 Although mentioning other federal court opinions, the Branning court pri-
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opinion. Based on its analysis, the Branning court con-
cluded, "it is clear that the Government's liability for a
taking is not precluded merely because the flights of Gov-
ernment aircraft are in what Congress has declared to be
navigable airspace and subject to its regulation. ' 21 3 In
support of this conclusion the court stated:
The question thus raised is whether the 500-foot altitude
is so critical a measure of the avigational servitude that lia-
bility can be avoided simply by flying noisier aircraft at an
altitude of 501 feet. Minimum safe altitude and minimum
noise levels are concerned with two different things. While
safety may be measured in terms of altitude, a reasonable
noise level cannot be measured solely in terms of alti-
tude .... Since the subjacent property owner has suffered
a diminution of the value of the property ... [i]t is abun-
dantly clear that under the law established by Causby,
Griggs, and Aaron a taking has occurred in this case.21 4
Having made this conclusion, the case was remanded to
the trial division to determine the date of the taking and
the amount of recovery.2 15
B. The Branning Exception
Seeing that the 500-foot barrier no longer barred litiga-
tion against the government might have prompted land-
owners, situated around military fields, to attempt other
Branning type suits. 2 16 This, no doubt, concerned the gov-
ernment's legal counsel. Without the 500-foot altitude
bar to litigation, each taking suit would have to be won on
marily focused on a discussion of Lacy v. United States, 595 F.2d 614 (Ct. Cl.
1979). The Branning court read the Lacy opinion as relying on the actual interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's land as a measure of recovery, rather than the altitude of
the particular overflights. Branning, 654 F.2d at 101.
. Branning, 654 F.2d at 99.
214 Id. at 101-02,
21.1Id. at 103.
2 ,; See, e.g., Stephens v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 352 (1986); Hero Lands Co. v.
United States, 554 F. Supp. 1262 (Cl. Ct. 1983); Powell v. United States, I Cl. Ct.
669 (1983) (a consolidation of six suits filed by owners of land near Robins Air
Force Base in Georgia).
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its merits. Fortunately for the government, Branning pro-
vided for its own demise.
Although the Branning decision was diametrically op-
posed to the Aaron decision, the Branning court refused to
reject Aaron outright. The per curiam opinion in Branning
very carefully explained that the holding was limited to
the specific facts of the case.21 7 This hesitance to reject
the Aaron opinion meant that Branning would have little
influence on airspace property issues in the future.
Courts can simply treat Branning as the exception to the
Aaron rule. 2 8 This being the case, the "fixed height" doc-
trine remains a viable theory of airspace property rights to
this very day.
IX. JUST EXACTLY WHO OWNS THE AIRSPACE?
A. The Modern View
More than eighty years after Kitty Hawk and more than
forty years after Causby, courts have yet to adopt a uniform
theory of airspace property ownership. When the air-
space involved lies below the 500-foot navigable airspace
level, most recent opinions focus on whether or not the
landowner's use and enjoyment of the land has been in-
terfered with in order to determine if a property right has
been taken. 2' 9 According to this approach, the landowner
owns just as much airspace above his property as is neces-
sary to allow him to use his land without substantial inter-
ference from above.
When the airspace involved lies above the 500-foot
level, the owner's rights to this airspace can be evaluated
in three different ways. First, courts following a strict
Aaron "fixed height" approach would state that a land-
217 Branning, 654 F.2d at 90. "Whether use of airspace above 500 feet for noisy
air navigation of a more conventional variety can be held a taking is an issue that
•.. is reserved for the case that presents it. In this case our taking holding turns
on the peculiar facts the trial judge has found." Id.
2' See, e.g., Hero Lands Co. v. United States, 554 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Cl. Ct.
1983); Powell v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 669, 673 (1983).
2... See, e.g., Lacy v. United States, 595 F.2d 614, 618 (Ct. CI. 1979).
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owner has no rights to airspace above 500 feet. 220 The
second approach involves a modified "fixed height" the-
ory, which allows for landowners' airspace rights above
500 feet only when the particular circumstances clearly
show that this airspace is required in order for the land-
owner to use his property without substantial interfer-
ence. 22 ' Finally, a court can conclude that the 500-foot
line is meaningless to the evaluation, and use the same
test applied to airspace falling below the 500-foot level. 2
B. Modern Airspace Property Rights Considerations
With the emphasis on interference with the "use and
enjoyment" of the land as a prerequisite to a determina-
tion of airspace property rights, it is important to know
just when this interference occurs. Probably the easiest
case of such interference occurs when the landowner's
livelihood is actually impaired or actual physical damage
is caused by the overflights in question. 3 Another exam-
ple occurs when the property becomes impractical for the
intended or possible use contemplated by the
landowner. 2 4
A helpful tool for determining if property has become
impractical for its intended or possible use in the vicinity
of military airfields is the Air Installation Compatible Use
Zone ("AICUZ") reports.22 5 These AICUZ reports, pre-
2 See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 669, 673 (1983).
221 See, e.g., Stephens v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 352, 362 (1986) (presumption
of non-taking when overflight occurs in navigable airspace); Hero Land Co. v.
United States, 554 F. Supp 1262, 1265-66 (Cl. Ct. 1983) (finding of non-taking for
flights in navigable airspace is appropriate unless peculiar facts of case require
opposite result).
222 See, e.g., Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88, 99-101 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
3775 Genesee Street, Inc. v. State, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979).
22 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945), itself serves as an excellent
example of these types of damages. For a more detailed version of the facts in this
case, see Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
224 See, e.g., Stephens v. United States, II Cl. Ct. 352 (1986).
".5 See Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88, 95-96 (Ct. Cl. 1981). When ex-
plaining the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) Program, the Branning
court stated:
[it] has been instituted to coordinate the requirements of the mis-
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pared by the government for all military airfields, com-
bine noise levels with accident potential statistics to arrive
at a determination of the appropriate use of land in the
vicinity of a military airfield.226 If the AICUZ report classi-
fies a plaintiff's land as unsuitable for practically any prof-
itable purpose, a court will probably determine that there
has been an interference with the plaintiff's use and en-
joyment of the land.227
Another major consideration in recent overflight cases
is the running of a statute of limitations. Many recent
cases have been dismissed because courts felt that the
landowner had waited too long to complain of an over-
flight problem that had existed for some time.2 If fre-
quent overflights give rise to an easement, landowners
must be required to assert a legal claim to their property
within a reasonable time, much like a landowner must do
when faced with an adverse possessor.229 Methods of
avoiding any statutes of limitations include claiming that a
preexisting easement has since been enlarged or ex-
panded by either noisier, lower, or more frequent over-
flights. 30 One downside of the previously mentioned
AICUZ for landowners is that it may put them on notice
of the impact of current air operations, thus starting the
statute of limitations running. 23'
sions of military air installations, with the developments of the sur-
rounding communities. The AICUZ is a concept of identifying
compatible and incompatible land use around an air station, the pur-
pose being to guide compatible private development through coop-
eration with local jurisdictions in order to minimize public exposure
to aircraft noise and accident potential, while at the same time main-
taining the operational capability of the station.
Id. at 95; see also Stephens v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct 352, 363 (1986).
226 Stephens, 11 Cl. Ct. at 363; Brany:.ing, 654 F.2d at 95-96.
227 Branning, 654 F.2d at 96.
22" See, e.g., Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988); Hero
Lands Co. v. United States, 554 F. Siip. 1262, 1266-67 (Cl. Ct. 1983).
229 Bieneman, 864 F.2d at 467-70.
230 See, e.g., Aaron v. United States 311 F.2d 798, 800-01 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
23 Branning, 654 F.2d at 96.
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C. Suggestions for the Future
One particularly interesting approach to the airspace-
as-property problem can be found in the dicta of a recent
United States Claims Court case entitled Stephens v. United
States.232 Although applying a modification of the Aaron
"fixed height" theory, the Stephens court hinted at a bal-
ancing formula that may be used in the future to more
accurately and equitably describe a landowner's airspace
rights.2 3 The particular language, taken admittedly out
of context, begins, "[a]s the height of the overflights [in-
crease], the Government's interest in maintaining air sov-
ereignty becomes weightier while the landowner's interest
diminishes, so that the damage showing required [to
prove a property interest] increases in a continuum to-
ward showing absolute destruction of all uses of the prop-
erty. ' 234 Concomitantly, the government's interest in
maintaining air sovereignty diminishes while the land-
owner's property interests increase as the height of the
overflights come closer and closer to the landowner's soil,
until the landowner can be said to have an unquestionable
right to that airspace actually in his possession. In this
respect, the interests of the landowner and the govern-
ment in airspace varies linearly and proportionately from
absolute ownership in the landowner at ground level to
absolute public ownership at a height where the land-
owner could not possibly be disturbed by aviation
overflights. 35
This type of approach would require a court to balance
the interests of the landowner with the public's right to
freedom of transit in every case. The altitude of the over-
flights would determine the burden and level of proof re-
quired. If an arbitrary altitude must be selected as an
232 11 Cl. Ct. 352 (1986)
2'3 See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text for the Stephens court's modi-
fication of the Aaron holding.
2.14 Stephens, 11 Cl. Ct. at 362.
25., The altitude at which a landowner's rights become absolutely non-existent
might be set at the base of the "Low Altitude Airway Structure." See supra note 16
and accompanying text for the definition of "Low Altitude Airway Structure."
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anchor point to the analysis, 500 feet could be used as the
point where the burden of proof shifts from the defendant
to the landowner to show interference with the use and
enjoyment of the land. Unlike an Aaron analysis, this
threshold would not give rise to an absolute bar to recov-
ery. Instead, the proof required to show interference
from overflights at 490 feet would be very close to that
required if the overflight occurred at 510 feet. The 500-
foot level would only mark the point at which the analysis
would begin to favor the defendant.
This type of analysis would correspond to the reasoning
found in Causby by focusing on the interference with the
use and enjoyment of the land.2 36  The Griggs opinion
would also complement this approach, since the proposed
analysis gives little weight to the fact that the overflight
might or might not be within navigable airspace.23 7 Per-
haps most importantly, the arbitrary "fixed height" theory
would finally be put to rest.238
2- For a discussion of the Causby approach, see supra notes 90-93 and accompa-
nying text.
2,7 For a discussion of the Griggs opinion, see supra notes 137-153 and accompa-
nying text.
2311 Branning, 654 F.2d at 102 n.22, provides an interesting example of the arbi-
trary nature of the "fixed height" rule and its lack of rational relation to some
overflight problems:
Gliders, for example, would not be a source of noise impact over a
residential area, even if flown at altitudes of less than 500 feet AGL
over such an area. However, flight of gliders over property at any
altitude might constitute a substantial accident risk. Conversely,
loud, annoying aircraft such as helicopters, repeatedly passing over a
residential area at an altitude above 500 feet AGL, might well be a
source of considerable noise impact and yet not create a substantial
accident risk at any given point below.
Id.
Another problem raised by the "fixed height" theory is the distinction of a 1000
foot navigable airspace floor over populated areas while over sparsely populated
areas the level is set at 500 feet. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 359. This distinc-
tion raises the question of discrimination against rural property owners who are
afforded half the airspace property rights apparently afforded urban landowners,
Id.
It is also interesting to note that while perhaps the statutory 500 foot level pro-
tects aviation overflights from being actionable by the landowner, it does not pro-
hibit landowners from trespassing above that altitude into the public domain.
The Federal Aviation Administration is practically powerless to prohibit a land-
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Until courts adopt such a sliding scale of airspace prop-
erty rights, they should at least refrain from using the
flawed "fixed height" analysis made popular by the Aaron
decision. 239  The United States Supreme Court has ig-
nored the "fixed height" theory in Causby,2 40 and repudi-
ated the theory in the Griggs holding 24' and in dicta found
in Brani .242 There seems little justification for the "fixed
height" theory other than judicial efficiency.243 This effi-
ciency justification is clearly outweighed by the constitu-
tionally protected property interests of the landowner.
A better approach to airspace property questions can
be found in the Branning opinion. 44 Although admittedly
a uniquely aviation related approach to the issue of tak-
ings under the Constitution,24 5 the proper focus in all
overflight cases should be on the harm incurred by the
landowner and not on the altitude at which the flight oc-
curred. 46 The realities of larger, noisier, and more fre-
quent air travel in modern America leave little pretext for
owner from building structures in the federal airway system, such as radio towers.
See 14 C.F.R. Part 77 (1989). The FAA can request that the FCC refuse to license
any transmitting structures. Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449, 452-53 (6th
Cir. 1980). In this manner the FAA does exert indirect authority over some struc-
tures, but not through the invocation of any "minimum safe altitude" regulation.
Id. at 453.
2.1 Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963). For a criticism of the
reasoning found in the Aaron opinion, see supra notes 164-195 and accompanying
text.
.0 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see supra notes 55-93 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the Causby opinion.
24 Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); see supra notes 137-153
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Griggs opinion.
'24 Braniff, 347 U.S. at 590; see supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Braniff opinion.
2-, For a discussion of the judicial efficiency rationale that helped to promote
the "fixed height" theory, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
244 Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88 (Ct. Cl. 1981). For a discussion of
the Branning approach to overflight problems, see supra notes 202-215 and accom-
panying text.
2 For a discussion of the unusual focus on harm to the landowner used when
evaluating taking issues under the Causby test, see supra notes 116-120. See supra
notes 107-108 and accompanying text for a discussion ofJustice Black's attack on
such a focus in the Causby dissenting opinion.
24, For an analysis of the test presented by the United States Supreme Court in
Causby, see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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a continued adherence to a fixed altitude of 500 feet as a
bar to all overflight suits.
X. CONCLUSION
When approaching a potential overflight suit today, a
landowner can evaluate some factors of his case with cer-
tainty. First, any action involving the taking of an aviga-
tion easement must begin before the running of the
appropriate statute of limitations. The best argument in
support of a claim that the statutory period has not yet
run is proof that the scope of any preexisting avigational
easement has been expanded by a recent increase in air
traffic.
Once over the statute of limitations issue, the land-
owner must determine if he will be able to prove the harm
imposed by the avigation easement. This harm can in-
clude actual physical damage, diminution in property
value, infringement on the owner's occupation or liveli-
hood, and other interferences with the owner's "use and
enjoyment" of his land. If the landowner does possess
such proof of harm, then the last point of concern is the
altitude of the overflights.
If the overflights complained of occurred below 500
feet above the ground, the landowner's right to bring the
suit will probably be conceded. In this event, the issues of
the statute of limitations and harm will be the primary
points of contention. If the overflights complained of oc-
curred above the 500-foot level, a close reading of the law
of the particular jurisdiction is required.
As discussed in this comment, courts may approach the
issue of overflights within "navigable airspace" as raising
a complete bar to litigation or of no consequence at all.
Most courts would at a minimum, however, carefully scru-
tinize any claim involving flights above 500 feet. Very few
jurisdictions can be expected to allow recovery for the tak-
ing of an avigational easement within "navigable air-
space" without an extraordinary showing of the harm
caused by such overflights. What factual situation consti-
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tutes an "extraordinary showing" of harm is by no means
clear.
With no definitive standard yet enunciated, and courts
mixed in their approach to the question, landowners must
still wonder just exactly what their property rights are to
the airspace above their land. Any answer to this question
must carefully balance the constitutional and economic
rights of the landowner with the economic and national
interests in aviation. If one thing is certain, the land-
owner does have a property interest in airspace. The diffi-
culty remains in describing with precision what that
property interest encompasses. Perhaps the nature of air-
space itself will forever preclude an exact answer. Per-
haps low altitude airspace will always be a property rights
"no-man's land."
